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DISCUSSIONS AND REPLIES 
SESSIONV 
Discussion by Shamsher Prakash 
Prof. Civil Engineering Dept. 
University of Missouri-Rolla 
on 
"Braced Excavation at the NIPSCO Bailly Station Power Plant" 
Paper No. 5.25 
Reconstruction of intake and discharge lines at NIPS CO plant was 
interesting, but the original collapse of the pipes would also be an 
interestin~ case history. 
What can you tell us about the collapse of the pipes, and what can 
we learn from it? 
Discussion by Sanjeev Kumar 
Assistant Engineer, 
Punjab State Electricity Board, 
Punjab, India 
on 
Failure of Twenty-Foot High Wall: Learning 
From case Histories 
Paper No. 5.31 
"A little knowledge is a dangerous thing" this 
proverb has been proved by the author here. A 
double cantilever wall system with a lower 
wall of about 16 ft height and above that a 
wall of about 10 ft height, in central Texas 
collapsed after a period of rain fall, within 
two months of its completion. The reason was 
inadequate design. The wall system was 
designed by a registered professional engineer 
who was 'a generalist and did design work in 
most areas of civil engineering, but was not 
trained specially in geotechnical engineering. 
the designer literally followed the 
recommendations in the standard handbook for 
civil engineers without understanding the 
limitations of such design and apparently saw 
little need to perform extensive soil tests. 
Main shortcomings in the design reported by 
the author were 1) two wall sections were 
analyzed separately and the effect of upper 
wall on the lower one was ignored 2) no slope 
stability type analysis were performed to 
examine the possibility of an overall failure 
3) improper drainage system to drain water 
from the back of the wall and 4) high wall-
soil friction coefficient. 
Since there was an interest in getting the 
project in operation and the wall may have 
been a late addition to the design, there 
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might not have time to perform extensive soil 
tests. But even then, I am of the opinion that 
if the designer had the knowledge of the 
behavior of the soils under different drainage 
conditions and design of retaining walls, this 
damage could have been easily avoided by 
simply considering the effect of upper wall on 
the lower one and by providing the proper 
drainage system. Any engineer who has basic 
concept of forces and moments, can not make a 
mistake of ignoring the effect of upper wall 
on the lower one. Provision of proper drainage 
system definitely requires the knowledge of 
geotechnical engineering. 
The designer also designed a cantilever 
retaining wall exceeding 26 ft in height for 
some of the portion in the same project· 
cantilever retaining walls are uneconomical 
above 20 ft height of wall. Provision of 
counterfort retaining wall would have been 
more appropriate. 
Failure is a full scale destructive test and 
gives useful information to guide future 
endeavors. It is lesson for which price has 
already been paid. If the similar failure can 
be avoided by learning a lesson from the 
earlier failure, this can be considered a 
price to progress. This case history once 
again reminded that a work in the hands of a 
amateur will lead to mess. 
Discussion by J. N. G6mez S. 
Partner, Geotechnical Branch 
C.I.C. Ltda, Bogota, COLOMBIA. 
Professor of Advanced Soil Mechanics, Javeriana 
University, Bogota, COLOMBIA. 
on 
Failure of a Twenty-Foot High 
Retaining Wall 
Paper No. 5.31 
The failure of a double cantiliver 
retaining wall is presented. The upper wall 
(UW) is 10 ft (3 m) high and the lower one (LW) 
is 16 ft (5 m). Total wall system height is 
26ft (8 m). It failed in a length of about 100 
ft (30m). Soil investigation at the site was 
rather poor: borings were not drilled and test 
were limited to soil classification. The 
design of the wall system had basic erroneous 
assumptions such as to consider the walls 
separately rather than designing the LW taking 
into account the active effect of the UW on it. 
On the other hand, no overall stability 
analysis was performed. 
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The author carried out a site 
investigation, reviewed the original design and 
undertook a design of the LW taking into 
account the effect of the UW. The scope of the 
study included two phases: the first one dealt 
with the calculation of the lateral force upon 
the LW imposed both by the weight of the soil 
wedge above it and the UW, and the second one, 
consisted in evaluating the safety factors of 
the LW against overturning, sliding and bearing 
capacity. There was not sufficient information 
such as the original soil profile, to perform 
a realistic overall stability analysis. 
The work is valuable, well documented and 
comprehensive. A cross section of the site, 
however, showing the idealized soil profile 
after failure, obtained from the results of the 
site investigation would have been helpful. 
Figure 1 summarizes the results of the author's 
analysis in terms of safety factors for drained 
and undrained conditions. It is clear that the 
LW could not be stable from the bearing 
capacity and sliding points of view. It was 
founded on weak soil and supporting a load of 
about 15 kips/ft (22.4 ton/m). 
The writer would stress among other facts 
included in the paper, that special attention 
has to be paid to bearing capacity and sliding 
checks, rather than following common and 
established practice of calculation for 
retaining wall design presented in many civil 
engineering books. When geotechnical 
parameters are involved in the design of a 
structure, geotechnical judgment and expertise 
coupled with a site investigation program are 
important in order to understand the behavior 
of it and to select the appropiate strength of 
the materials involved. 
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Discussion by Dr. Eyjolfur Ami Rafusson 
Honnun Ud., Consulting Engineers, ICELAND 
on 
Failure of a Twenty-Foot High Retaining Wall 
Paper No. 5.31 
A failure of 20' high retaining wall, designed and constructed 
to provide area for parking spaces and driveways for a shopping 
center in central Texas, has been discussed in tbis paper. The failure 
"led to losses in excess of $1 Ji:lillion for the designer". The retaining 
wall was a 1300' (-400 m) long with a maximum height of 26'9" 
(-8.2 m), measured from the top of the keyway. The presence of a 
high concrete wall was objected by the city environmentalists. Thus, a 
relatively low single wall was designed over much of the length and 
where the wall was higher than about 15' (-4.6 m) a double wall was 
designed, over 700' (-210 m) long. A vegetation was planned in 
between the two walls. Site investigation for the wall design was 
limited. The designer practically followed the Standard Handbook of 
Civil Engineers, by Meritt. Factor of safety against tilting was 
sufficient, calculated about the toe. The effect of the upper wall on 
the lower one was ignored, overall stability was ignored, sliding factor 
of safety was only about 1.0, the toe stress was high. Drainage was, 
for both walls, provided by 2" diameter PVC drainage tubes. The 
wall is believed to have been completely backfilled in May. In late 
July, after a period of heavy rain, a 135' (-41 m) long section of the 
lower wall began to displace horizontally. The wall continued to move 
horizontally at a slow rate. Post-failure soil investigation showed that 
the fi11, which not failed, was partly a dty granular fill. The fill that 
had failed was soft rocky clay, h.avingf LL=54, PL=33, and wc=31 
%. The fill seemed to be "reasonably well compacted". Drained direct 
shear tests (4) showed both peak and residual effective cohesi()Jl as 
100 psf ( 4.8 kPa), but effeclive fiiction angle as 25° and 16° for peak 
and residual conditions, respectively. Post-failure stability analysis of 
the retaining wall showed that factor of safety against tilting was 
sufficient while it was far from being sufficient against sliding, bearing 
capacity, and overall stability. It should be kept in mind that actually 
only the lower wall is of a concern. The main conclusion of the 
paper, that "engineers should not practice out of their areas of training 
and experience", is a necessazy warning that always should be kept in 
mind. Why did the wall stand up at all? It is the discusser believe that 
negative pore pressure may have helped initially. Following the rain a 
positive pore pressure, ineffeclive drainage system, and the designer 
lack of knowledge was the main cause of the wa.11 failure. The paper 
should be read by evety engineer as a lesson on how things can 
easily go wrong although they look simple. 
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Reply by R. E. Olson 
on 
Paper No. 5.31. 
In his discussion, Mr. Gomez asks for more information 
on an idealized soil profile. In the immediate area of the 
failure, the wall was underlain by a deep layer of clay 
shale, possibly as much as 100m thick. In the upper ten 
meters, the clay shale contained seams of limestone with 
the thickness of each seam about 10 em, and a vertical 
spacing of the order of one meter. Some borings showed 
similar seams of gypsum. Standard penetration 
resistances at shallow depth were 67 to 87 blows/30 em 
and unconfined compressive strengths on cores were 
usually around 520-570 kPa (5.5 to 6.0 tst). Along most 
of the length of the wall, where failure did not occur, the 
ground surface was higher then in the failure zone, the 
wall therefore not so tall, and the wall was underlain by 
up to 3 meters of solid limestone overlying the deep 
shale. 
Mr. Gomez emphasized the need to consider sliding and 
bearing capacity failure modes. The author agrees and 
emphasized in the paper the difficulties associated with 
attempts to calculate, and limit, toe stresses instead of 
considering the overall bearing capacity mode of failure. 
Mr. Kumar observed that cantilever walls of this height 
are not economical and suggested use of a counterfort 
wall. Design calculations, obtained during litigation, 
gave no indication that the designer considered other 
alternatives. It appears that cantilever walls were used 
because they were covered in the civil engineering 
handbooks. However, counterfort walls would generally 
not be economical in the United States because of the 
increased labor costs. During the remedial phase of the 
work consideration was given to using reinforced earth 
and other walls with shallow foundations and tie backs 
but none were stable in the bearing capacity mode. 
Finally, the natural slope was reformed and the parking 
was provided on a structural slab constructed out over the 
slope. The slab was supported on deep drilled piers. 
Dr. Rafnsson believes that the wall was initially stable 
because of negative pore water pressures in the backfill. 
The paper includes several reasons why the wall stood up 
in spite of low calculated factors of safety. The fourth 
reason listed was negative pore water pressures in the 
backfill. The rainfall that immediately preceded the 
failure apparently diminished these negative pore water 
pressures and also increased water pressures directly in 
the walls. 
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